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Volume 3 Chicago • Illinois Number 2
On the Art of Argument
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn introduced Chief Justice Walter V. Schaefer '28 and Mr. James A. Dooley at their discussion
"On the Art of Argument" before The Law School students and faculty. Mr. Llewellyn reminded the audience that the
conscious study of the art of argument once had high development among the Greeks and again in medieval times. He wel­
comed our speakers as reintroducing into American thinking a study which had been too long neglected.
THE APPELLATE COURT
CHIEF JUSTICE WALTER V. SCHAEFER
Illinois Supreme Court
I am largely but not entirely at a loss. I am not a
prophet. I am not a great scholar. I am not a great teach­
er. My role here was described and anticipated some
years ago by a very great lawyer, John W. Davis. He was
giving an address on appellate advocacy, and he peppered
his remarks with something like this: "I must apologize
for being here before you to speak upon the subject, for
who would listen to the weary discourse of the fisherman
on the relative attractiveness of various types of flies, if
the fish could be induced to talk." Taking my role from
this story, I am the fish, and I am to indicate the relative
effectiveness of various types of lures. As I understand it,
I am to talk upon the subject of appellate presentation,
including both the brief and the oral argument.
So far as the literature on the subject of briefs is con­
cerned, I would refer you to two articles by two Illinois
lawyers, Paul Ware and Owen RaIl, and they are as good
as anything I have seen anywhere on the subject. The
articles are in the spring, 1952, issue of the Illinois Law
Forum. These articles will refer you to the rest of the
literature, including the essays by Wiener, Jackson,
Davis, Wilkins, Carr, and all the rest. Actually, you can
cover the literature in the field in a fairly satisfactory
fashion in two hours. It is a rather fascinating little select
body of literature. I do not think the literature generally
is perhaps too profound, but it is interesting, and it is fun
reading.
\
Now, just a word as to the brief, and this word is
equally applicable to oral arguments. Keep in mind
your purpose and keep in mind the person or persons to
whom your argument is addressed. I think this is of the
(Continued on page 11.>
THE TRIAL COURT
JAMES A. DOOLEY
President, Association of Plaintiffs' Lawyers
This meeting to me represents the realization of a
proposition for which I have always stood; namely, that
the law schools should teach the law students something
about litigation. No lawyer can be a lawyer in the true
sense of the term unless he knows the problem of liti­
gation. And I mean the problem of litigation in the trial
court, the problem of litigation in the appellate court,
and in Chief Justice Schaefer's court. How can a lawyer
even advise a client unless that lawyer appreciates the
problems which go with litigation? If you are to be
lawyers in the true sense of the word, learn as much
as possible about this problem.
A medical student does not go into the world and per­
form an operation on someone merely from the knowl­
edge he obtained on surgery out of the textbooks. He has
worked in the laboratory; he has assisted and has par­
ticipated in operations. That is where he gets his work­
ing knowledge. And there is a laboratory for all of us
students of the law, and we must remain students as long
as we practice-that laboratory is the courtroom. And I
think it characteristic of the progressive nature of the Uni­
versity of Chicago in seeking to bring the laboratory of
the law to the law school. It is much like meeting the
mountain, since the mountain cannot be brought here.
Now, of course, we are back in the trial court. The case
has been reversed and remanded for trial by the Chief
Justice.
The most important phase in the trial of any case is the
preparation phase, and that facet is accomplished without
the confines of the courtroom. Ninety per cent of all cases
tried, in my opinion, are won or lost outside the court-
(Continued on page 13)
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FACULTY PROFILE
Sheldon Tefft
Without intending to pin the
dread label of conservatism on
Sheldon Tefft, I see no escape
from stating, right at the outset,
the unpleasant fact (if I must
write a "profile" of him) that he
is-well, not a liberal. Hugh Cox
-a fellow-Nebraskan and lawyer
-has opined that his friend
Sheldon is not quite so conserva­
tive as he appears to be. I have
no superior knowledge. But I
can imagine him voting against
all sorts of measures and candidates during the last two
decades. He has been definitely of the minority.
Tefft seems to me to be a vanishing American in
other respects, apart from the political. Perhaps I should
hopefully indicate here, too, only a temporary obscurity,
not oblivion. There used to be an ideal of "nothing too
much," balance, moderation; reserve was once considered
admirable in social behavior; care in speaking and cau­
tion in acting were thought to be advisable. On a higher
level, justice was not supposed to be dispensed exclusive­
ly by courts but also by individual persons in their opin­
ions and dealings. There have been times in the past
when those concepts had more adherents than they
seem to have now. More sensational values have risen to
a higher rank in contemporary life; the manifestations
are everywhere, from Hollywood east and Washington
west. To this development Sheldon Tefft has been quite
impervious. His values are those first mentioned.
It follows that in the teaching of his subjects, property
and equity, Tefft is a most careful, patient, very critical,
and truly just exhibitor, adviser, expounder, and de­
bater. He happens also to be a physically vigorous teach­
er, and it is not unusual for him to have thirty or more
students actively taking part in the class discussion. His
methods are modern-true conservatism having no corre­
spondence with obsolete technique-but he does not
make a stunt of confusion. The most influential element
in his teaching is, however, his own mind and character.
I should prescribe him as a cure for exhibitionism and
dilettantism. He has been effective in both diseases and
not only in the field of law.
I am not sure that the students in Tefft's classes really
understand and appreciate what a phenomenon he is,
personally-well, anyhow, what I think he is. In appear­
ance and manner, as well as in other respects, Sheldon
Tefft is as authentic an embodiment of the early Amer­
ican spirit as one could hope to see in the mid-twentieth
century; he is early American stock personified-the kind
you read about in the history books. If you want to know
what the best Americans were like, down to the end of
the last century, just observe Sheldon Tefft. All people
have ancestors and backgrounds, but Tefft seems to me
to suggest his far more than the average.
This is all fiction, no doubt. I shall pursue it further,
however, since through fiction the truth can ,sometimes
be seen. Tefft is more specifically an early American of
the North. As a northern type, very antique, he has been
in this country for a long time, since the seventeenth
century. We find him first in the New England states
and upstate New York. He had farms there. He owned
his farms from the beginning, and always. He farmed
the land, too, but of course he did much more. He
founded churches and villages; he incorporated little
railroads; he took part in politics; he read serious books
and thought and debated and had views on social, philo­
sophical, and religious questions; and he speculated in
town lots and western lands. He fought in all the wars
up to and including the Civil War, except the Mexican
War, that southern imbroglio, which he could not con­
scientiously support. He founded the Republican party,
or was certainly one of its earliest members. It was nat­
ural, therefore, when this type went out to build up "our
West" across the wide Missouri-in Cass County, Ne­
braska, below Omaha-shortly before and after the Civil
War, that he should take a prominent part in the early
politics of the state. In Nebraska the counties were
named after Democrats but settled by Republicans. So we
find Sheldon Tefft-that is to say, a Sheldon or a Tefft­
in the territorial legislature, in the state senate, at the
head of the Republican state committee, and, just before
Wilson swept away the ancien regime, in the governor's
chair.
Against that background, and not unnaturally, as his
father was a country lawyer, Sheldon Tefft decided to
take up the law. He attended the University of Nebraska
from 1918 to 1924, both as an undergraduate and as a
law student. Here he won, of course, Phi Beta Kappa
and the Order of the Coif. In 1924 he was chosen a
Rhodes scholar. From Oxford he received three de­
grees-B.A. in 1926, B.C.L. in 1927, and M.A. in 1930; in
addition, he won the Vinerian prize in 1927. If Tefft had
carried on in the family tradition, he would be farming
and practicing law and politics in Nebraska today, but
Oxford turned him into a scholar and a teacher. It did
not otherwise change him. A member of the committee
that selected him for the scholarship remarked at the time
that, there was no danger of Sheldon Tefft's pretending
to be an Englishman on his return home. That predic­
tion was proved correct.
In 1929, after a short period as an assistant professor of
law at the University of Nebraska, Tefft came to The
Law School. In 1940 he became a professor. From 1943
to 1945 he was acting dean. There were brief escapes
from Chicago to teach for a term at Stanford in 1935 and
(Continued on page 20)
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Construction of the new American Bar Center is proceeding rapidly. The top picture is a front view of the virtually completed
west wing of the building; the bottom picture, looking east from University Avenue, shows work in progress on the east wing.
Plans are being made to dedicate the Center at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association, which will be held in
Chicago this August.
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The Conference on Insurance
On January 15, 1954, the Law School presented a Con­
ference on Insurance, the thirteenth in its regular Con­
ference Series. The opening session was concerned with
problems of the insurance contract. Professor Brainerd
Currie of the Faculty presided; the speakers were Profes­
sor Friedrich Kessler of the Yale Law School, who dis­
cussed "Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract"; Mr.
James B. Donovan, of Watters and Donovan, New York
City, whose subject was "The Hardy Perennials of In­
surance Contract Litigation"; and Mr. Herbert Brook, of
Lord, Bissell and Kadyk, who spoke on "Recent Insur­
ance Contract Developments and Their Implication for
Future Litigation."
Professor Wilber Katz introduced the luncheon session,
which was concerned with insurance and investment.
Mr. M. Albert Linton, chairman of the Board of the
Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadel­
phia, discussed "Life Insurance as an Investment." The
subject of "The Insurance Company as an Investor­
Impact on the Capital Market" was presented by Mr.
Churchill Rodgers, general counsel of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company; he was followed by Mr. J. Ed­
ward Day, associate general solicitor of the Prudential
Insurance Company, who spoke on "The Insurance Com­
pany as an Investor-Government Regulation of Invest­
ments."
In the afternoon meeting, Professor Ward Bowman of
the Faculty introduced a paper on "Government Regula­
tion of Insurance Marketing Practices," presented by Mr.
Robert B. Ely, III, general counsel of the Insurance
Company of North America, after which Mr. Barry
Oakes, associate counsel, Bankers Life Company, Des
Moines, spoke on "Principal, Agent, and the Public."
Professor Allison Dunham presided over the evening
session, which featured a discussion of "The Insurance
Principle-Compulsory Insurance" by Professor Clarence
Morris of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
an address on the subj ect of "The Insurance Principle­
Government Old-Age and Survivors Insurance" by Mr.
John R. Stark, Executive Office of the President (Bureau
of the Budget), Washington.
Friedrich Kessler, now Professor in the Yale Law School,
and at one time a member of the University of Chicago Law
School Faculty, took advantage of the opportunity to talk
with his former students during his visit to the campus for
the Conference on Insurance.
The Luncheon Session of the Conference on Insurance brought together the group shown above at the speaker's table.
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Book Reviews
THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION. By Wal­
ter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 104. $2.50.
[Reprinted, with permission, from Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 67, No.4, pp. 725-31, February, 1954.]
"A word fitly spoken," it was said in Old Testament
days, "is like apples of gold in pictures of silver." This
book, unlike much tax literature, has many sentences
full of words most fitly spoken at this critical period of
American tax history. It is a stimulating and highly in­
formative book. For years the printing presses have been
busy putting together books designed to acquaint read­
ers interested in taxes with the super-technical secrets of
tax law as they are incorporated in the Internal Revenue
Code, the administrative process, and the diverse opin­
ions of many courts. In contrast, this book deals with
basic theory at a tender point. Justice Holmes once said:
"We have too little theory in the law rather than too
much...." This remark, made in another context, is
certainly not inapplicable to tax law-and, one can ap­
propriately add, tax policy.
There is a surprising lack of unanimity among the
experts as to the degree of progression in the American
system of taxation. Of course, accurate appraisal must
include the impact of state and local taxes. Rufus S.
Tucker, writing in 1951, has asserted that as a whole the
system is "highly progressive in the matter of rates from
$1,000 up," this being especially true, in his opinion, of
federal taxation by itself. But Musgrave, Carroll, Cook,
and Frane, also writing in 1951, have asserted a conflict­
ing view that "[ t ] he over-all tax structure is by no means
as progressive as is generally surmised, at least not as
far as the lower 90 per cent of the taxpayers are con­
cerned." Rather, they contend, "the effective rate curve
follows a U-shaped pattern with regression at the lower
end, a proportional range over the middle and progression
at the upper end of the scale." Over a wide range of in­
comes, including 90 or more per cent of the spending
units, the progressive elements of the tax structure ap­
pear to these economists "to be balanced or outweighed
by others which are proportional or regressive." In
terms of revenue it may be roughly estimated that some­
thing less than one-quarter of total receipts from the
personal income tax is attributable to the graduated sur­
taxes.
In point of fact no one knows with any complete cer­
tainty how progressive the American tax system is. Con­
tributing to this uncertainty is much doubt about the
incidence of corporate taxes. For the fiscal year 1953 the
corporation income tax contributed about 31 per cent of
the gross yield of the federal tax system. Are corporate
taxes borne by stockholders? To the extent that they
are, they have a generally progressive effect because stock
ownership is predominantly in the upper income brack-
ets. Or are corporate taxes shifted to consumers and
wage earners? If that is what happens below the surface
of statutory language of imposition, corporate taxes are
regressive in their effect. Also contributing to a general
ignorance about the degree of progressivity in the Amer­
ican tax system is lack of knowledge about the effect
on an apparently progressive rate structure of a num­
ber of special exemptions and deductions such as the
exemption of interest on state and municipal bonds and
the percentage depletion provision.
In this vague condition of tax affairs it is almost a re­
lief to turn attention to some things we do know very
well. We do know that many of our most articulate
citizens assert most emphatically that we have too much
progression, presumably toward the top of the surtax
brackets. One would expect that this feeling of resent­
ment would have had more intensity before the income
tax "changed its morning coat for overalls." There was
a time when the income tax was a more exclusive club
than it is now, say in 1920 when a population of 106,-
000,000 produced only about 5,500,000 income tax re­
turns, or in 1939 when a population of close to 100,000,000
over 14 years of age produced only about 4,000,000 tax­
payers. In those years the income tax directed its thrust
more exclusively at the most financially successful of
our citizens. Now it strikes at a much larger proportion
of the population. Apparently misery does not always
derive as much comfort from company as is sometimes
supposed. Perhaps part of the reason is in this instance
that there has been since 1939 a considerable shift of
our emphasis in taxation in the direction of income and
profits taxation. In 1939 income and profits taxes pro­
duced only about 45 per cent of government receipts.
By 1952 they produced almost 80 per cent. It does not
seem to be adequate compensation that new low-income
taxpayers have contributed in large part to this trend.
High-income taxpayers have also had to contribute, and
we have now reached the point where everything pos­
sible is being taken from the high incomes of those who
are not fortunate enough to be able to take advantage
of the capital gain rate, the percentage depletion provi­
sion, and a number of further gadgets which minimize
the impact of the high marginal rates.
Much of the protest against progression has identified
progressive taxation as an aspect of class warfare. Some
advocates of progression have not objected to this label.
A recent article in the American Bar Association Journal
entitled "The History of a Prophecy: Class War and the
Income Tax" seems to set the modern record for emo­
tional intensity. Mr. Samuel B. Pettengill, the author of
the article, views the Sixteenth Amendment as "a pol­
itical curiosity," and according to this former Congress­
mart a number of Republicans headed by former Pres­
ident William Howard Taft carried a Democratic plank
to legislative success when they submitted the amend­
ment for ratification. Perhaps something worse than
(Continued on page 17)
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Alumni Notes
JUDGE ELMER J. SCHNACKENBERG, JD'12, for some years
Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of Cook County, has
been appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, and was formally in­
stalled as a member of that court
in late February. He joins an
illustrious group of classmates,
the Class of 1912 having already
contributed to the United States
Courts of Appeal the Honorable
Florence Allen, of the Third
Circuit, 'the Honorable Jerome
N. Frank, of the Second Circuit,
and the Honorable Walter L.Glen lloyd
Pope of the Ninth Circuit. Also
a member of this distinguished class is the Honorable
Ingram Stainback, Territorial Governor of Hawaii.
GLEN A. LLOYD, JD'23, has been appointed Deputy to
Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Oper­
ations Administration. Mr. Lloyd is a partner in the firm
of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd, and is President of
the Law School Alumni Association and a Trustee of the
University of Chicago.
ARNOLD R. BAAR, JD'14, for many years a partner in
the Chicago firm of Kixmiller, Baar and Morris, has been
appointed a Judge of the Tax Court of the United States,
and began serving with that Court in April.
ROBERT TIEKEN, Class of 1932, has been appointed by
President Eisenhower to be United States District Attor­
ney for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Tieken has
for several years been a member of the Chicago firm of
Winston, Strawn, Black and Towner.
IRWIN N. COHEN, Class of '30, served this winter as
temporary United States Attorney for the Northern Dis­
trict of Illinois. Mr. Cohen, an Assistant United States
Attorney since 1949, was elected by the eight judges of
the United States District Court.
CHARLES B. BAKER, JD'38, has been appointed president
of Universal Atlas Cement Company, a subsidiary of the
United States Steel Corporation, with which he has been
associated in a variety of capacities since his graduation
from the Law School.
Scholarship News
The academic year 1954-55 will be the second of three
years in which a student of the School will receive a
scholarship of the value of $1,000 as a gift of the Ekco
Foundation. This Foundation was established by the
Ekco Corporation, of which Mr. Benjamin A. Ragir,
Class of 1936, is president.
The Leo F. Wormser Scholarship was established in 1935
by friends of Mr. Wormser, JD'09. In 1940 a gift to his
fund was made by Mrs. Leo F. Wormser in memory of
Mr. Wormser's mother; from time to time further funds
have been contributed by friends of the family. This
winter, substantial additional contributions have been
received. These added resources will renew the strength
of the Wormser Fund, which has already benefited many
able students, among whom were Tucker Dean, now
professor of law at New York University; Monrad Paul­
sen, professor of law at the University of Minnesota;
Kent Luckingbeal, of Root, Ballantine, Bushby and
Palmer, New York City; Dale Stucky, of Fleeson, Goo­
ing, Coulson and Kitch, Wichita, Kansas; and Dudley
Zinke, of Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro, San Francisco.
Mr. Arnold I. Shure, Class of
1929, has presented to the School
a full-tuition scholarship for the
academic year 1954-55. Mr.
Shure has for many years been
active in the affairs of the
School's alumni and was promi­
nent among the members of Phi
Sigma Delta Fraternity who last
year donated a full-tuition schol­
arship. Mr. Shure's gift will make
possible the continuance of the education of an unusually
promising student.
Arnold Shure
THE SUMMER QUARTER-PROGRAM OF COURSES
JUNE 21 TO AUGUST 28
CIVIL PROCEDURE. PHILIP B. KURLAND, Associate Pro­
fessor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
TORTS. Jo DESHA LUCAs, Assistant Professor of Law; The
University of Chicago Law School
FAMILY LAW. RALPH F. FUCHS, Visiting Professor, The
University of Chicago Law School; Professor of Law,
Indiana University School of Law
TRUSTS. GEORGE E. PALMER, Visiting Professor, The Uni­
versity of Chicago Law School; Professor of Law, Uni­
versity of Michigan Law School
PECEDENTS' ESTATES. CORWIN W. JOHNSON, Visiting
Professor, The University of Chicago Law School; Asso­
ciate Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law
CREDITORS' RIGHTS. WALTER J. BLUM, Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago Law School; WILBER G.
KATZ, Tames Parker Hall Professor of Law, The Univer­
sity of Chicago Law School
MILITARY LAW. WILLIAM R. MING, JR., Eecturer in
Law, The University of Chicago Law School
SEMINAR ON CORPORATE SECURITIES. CHARLES A.
BANE, Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law
School
In addition to the above, a seminar will be offered by
THE HONORABLE WALTER V. SCHAEFER, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Entering students may register for the courses in Civil
Procedure and in Torts.
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Present and former members of the Faculty, and alumni now teaching law, met at a luncheon during the annual meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools.
The guests hear a report on the Arbitration Project from Professor Soia MentschikotJ
Victor H. Kulp, JD'08, now Professor Emeritus at the University of Oklahoma Law School, and Victor Stone, Research
Associate on the Jury Project, at the reception preceding the Association of American Law Schools luncheon.
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Krock on Crosskey
In February, Mr. Arthur Krock, of the New York Times,
devoted two lengthy columns to comment on Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States, the recently
published work of Professor William W. Crosskey of the Law
School Faculty. By permission of the Times, Mr. Krock's
comments are reprinted below.
WASHINGTON, Feb. IS-Signs are appearing that, after
the current movement to amend the Constitution has
been disposed of, lawyers, judges, historians and profes­
sors of English will become even more fundamentally
involved over a new interpretation of the National Char­
ter than Senators and lawyers are now over an old one.
This revolutionary opinion of what the Founding Fathers
really intended the Constitution to mean was expressed
in a recent book by Prof. William Winslow Crosskey of
the Law School of the University of Chicago.
If the thesis of this book were before Congress instead
of the Bricker amendment and its flock of substitutes the,
current Senate debate would be riotous instead of mere­
ly confusing. That is why one critic has already described
the book as "dynamite," and why the law reviews are
devoting great space to it. Imagination falters before the
thought of what this book, if adopted as political doc­
trine by either major party, would do to the blood pres­
sures of Republicans and Democrats who already find
loopholes in the Constitution through which abuses of
what they consider strictly reserved Congressional and
state powers may enter our governing system.
Nevertheless, Crosskey's conclusions from the amazing
research he did are finding influential support. And there
is evidence that among his earnest students are members
of the Supreme Court. Yet at some point one of his con­
clusions rejects some firm belief held by experts who will
go along with others.
The New Deal lawyers who argued that the Consti­
tution's clause giving Congress authority over "com­
merce" should be interpreted with new breadth, and the
judges who sustained them, will be pleased with the re­
sult of his research on that subject. But they will not be
pleased with his conclusion that the Supreme Court has
been violating the Constitution in declaring that Acts of
Congress, except those in a limited group, are incon­
sonant with the National Charter. And so on.
WHAT WORDS MEANT IN 1789
The book began in 1937 with work on a proposed law
review article on the commerce clause. But this led to
a search of fifteen years through archives mostly undis­
turbed theretofore-forgotten files in large and small li­
braries, private papers, the whole context of the writing
of the Constitution. Crosskey put special labor on the
vocabulary of the eighteenth century, in which it was
composed. And he decided, according to the editors of
the University of Chicago Law Review, that:
The Constitution, far from being the glorious but vague,
and general statement of the purposes, powers, and, above
all, the limitations of our Federal Government, was in reality
a tight, meticulously drafted, wonderfully consistent docu­
ment.... As originally understood [in the eighteenth cen­
tury vocabulary] it provided a charter for a government ad­
mirably suited to modern conditions.
Among his conclusions were:
�"Commerce," as employed, meant "all gainful ac­
tivity" by the people; hence the long-made distinction be­
tween "interstate" and "intrastate" commerce is without
constitutional sanction.
�To interpret "states," as the Supreme Court does, to
mean "the territory" encompassed by each of them is
contrary to the eighteenth century meaning, which was
"the people" within those borders. Thus in those days
they wrote "The State of New York are able to supply
themselves," etc. This locution proves that the Founding
Fathers intended Congress to have the power to regulate
all gainful activity of the people everywhere.
PREAMBLE THE MASTER KEY
�Their intent also, when they gave Congress authority
to pass all laws necessary and proper for general welfare
and the common defense, was for Congress to be su­
preme among the different branches of the Government.
Legislative supremacy was the concept of the eighteenth
century. The language of the Preamble, which was care­
fully constructed in the locution of the time, proves this
by its statement of the Government's obligations, the
attainment of all of which was assigned to Congress.
�The English common law as applied to American
conditions, and Parliament's unreviewable power to
make statutes, formed the concept of the American
colonies in 1787-89. The Supreme Court was never in­
tended to possess a general power to review Acts of Con­
gress but only to protect its own enumerated powers as
expressed in eighteenth-century language.
�Conversely, the Supreme Court is not, as it has long
held, bound by the Constitution to follow the interpreta­
tions by state courts of state law and common law: in
accepting that limitation it has "abdicated" its granted
authority as the supreme tribunal.
�Except for the First Amendment, and the appeals
clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Bill of Rights was
designed to apply to the states as well as to the nation,
and the steady stream of laws and decisions to the con­
trary is made up of violations.
Historical research before has had its effects on the
Supreme Court, for instance Charles Warren's "New
Light on the Judiciary Act." The Crosskey book may
provide another example, but only after a forensic battle
of atomic intensity.
(Continued on page 17)
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Law School Notes
Frederick H. Lawson, Professor of Comparative Law,
Oxford University, delivered a public lecture on "A Com­
parative View of Administrative Law" under the au­
spices of the Law School. Earlier in his visit, Professor
Lawson discussed English legal education at a luncheon
meeting of the School's alumni.
John P. Stevens has been appointed a Lecturer in the
Law School and is currently teaching the course in
Competition and Monopoly. Mr. Stevens has been Coun­
sel for the Minority of the Celler Committee and has
been associated with the Chicago firm of Johnston,
Thompson, Raymond and Mayer. He is a member of the
Federal Committee on Antitrust Law, and is currently a
partner in the Chicago law firm of Rothschild, Stevens
and Barry.
The Honorable Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, and Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., University Professor, Harvard Law School,
were among the group of eight eminent members of the
profession who were to be awarded honorary degrees at
the Special Convocation in Celebration of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Law School last May.
Professor Chafee was abroad at that time, so the con­
ferring of his degree took place at the Autumn Convo­
cation last December. Following the Convocation, Pro­
fessor and Mrs. Chafee met the Faculty and students of
the School at a reception at the Quadrangle Club.
Illness prevented Mr. Justice Black from attending the
Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration last year. He received
his degree at the Winter Convocation in March. The [us­
tice was the honored guest at a reception which followed
the Convocation and which was attended by the Faculty,
alumni, and students of the School. Subsequent to the
reception, the residents of the Law School Dormitory
and the members of the staff of the Law Review spon­
sored a dinner for the Justice in the Residence Halls.
A luncheon meeting of Law School alumni now en­
gaged in the teaching of law, and of current and former
members of the Law School Faculty, was held at the
Edgewater Beach Hotel on the occasion of the annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools.
The guests heard reports from Professor Soia Mentschi­
koff and Professor Philip B. Kurland on the progress of
the Arbitration Project and the Jury Project, two of the
research activities which the School is conducting under
a grant from the Ford Foundation.
Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Professor of Comparative
Law, met with a group of Law School alumni in New
York to discuss the current activities of the School's
Comparative Law Research Center, of which Professor
Rheinstein is Director. Mr. Rheinstein has recently been
elected to honorary membership in the Gesellschaft fur
Rechtsvergleichung, the Society of Comparative Law of
Germany.
Dean Levi recently delivered an address on the anti­
trust laws before the Lawyers Association of Kansas City,
of which Roy K. Dietrich is president. Prior to the
speech, Dean Marlin M. Volz of the University of Kan­
sas City Law School held a reception in Mr. Levi's honor.
'Walter A. Raymond, '22, and Raymond B. Lucas, '15,
were among the alumni there to greet Mr. Levi.
John P. Stevens
Max Rheinstein
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The reception honoring Mr. Justice Black seems to have been well attended
The students oj the School honor the Justice with a dinner,
following the University Convocation.
Frederick H. Lawson, Professor of Comparative Law, Oxford
University, delivering a public lecture in Law South.
Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black enjoying an informal conversation
with a group of students following his receipt of an honorary
degree.
William King, Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., of Harvard
Law School, and Professor Malcolm Sharp, at the reception
honoring Professor Chafee. The reception followed a Uni­
versity Convocation at which Professor Chafee was awarded
an honorary degree.
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The Appellate Court (Continued tram page 1)
utmost importance. We find some briefs in our courts by
lawyers who, presumably, are well compensated for the
job that start off something like this: "The trial court
erred in refusing to give full effect to the previous decree
of the court of Macontoby. It is well established that a
decree rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
person in the subject matter is entitled to...." And then
cases are cited. Our Court does not have from this the
faintest notion of what the case is about. I have literally
read as much as ten pages of a brief without being told
what the case was about. In fact, our Court has read en­
tire briefs and in at least one instance heard an oral
argument without being told what the lawyer's point
was-and this after some effort .to abstract a clarifying
statement by questions from the bench. So keep in mind
that your main objective is clarity. You are trying to get
the court to understand.
There are some subsidiary aspects to the problem of
clarity-of getting the court to understand. The court is
approaching the matter from an entirely objective point
of view. In real life, as a lawyer before the appellate
court, you will be approaching the argument with the
heat of the trial court still about you. The tendency to
carryover some of that heat will be hard to avoid. But
you should avoid it scrupulously. The heat of the trial
battle will not help the reviewing court at all. It will not
help your case.
Both in the oral argument and in the written brief be
wary of how you use the court's own language. A man
does not sit very long on an appellate court before he
becomes extremely cautious as to the meaning of what
some judge, including himself, has said in some earlier
case. Your naivete about that when you are a judge lasts
just until the first time somebody quotes back at you
something you have written yourself. After that experi-
.encc, your guard is eternally up. Having seen how what
you wrote with a particular situation in mind and con­
fined to that really-and perhaps you were a little care­
less, even though you tried not to be-can be quoted as
applicable in quite different circumstances, you are going
to be cautious about taking thewords at their sheer face
value, whether it be your language or some other judge's.
Moreover, opinions do not all have the same value. Even
your own opinions are not all of equal persuasiveness to
you; they are not all of equal effect. That is because of
what your job is and because of the characteristic of the
business. The universal characteristic that every case
shares in common with every other case is that it has to
be decided, and in a reviewing court typically it has to be
decided by written opinion. You convince yourself as
Cardozo once said, Sl per cent, and then you write an
opinion that indicates you are convinced 99 per cent.
Your colleagues may go along with the opinion convinced
in varying degrees from somewhere in the 40 per cent
area up to somewhere in the 70 per cent range. The
opinion that emerges is the opinion of the court, but it is
actually a very close decision, not to be stretched, not to
be expanded, and not to be distorted.
If you are asking the court to overrule a case, you
should do so frankly. If your brief fails to mention a case
which governs or has governed the kind of situation in­
volved, the judge may read your brief with an uneasy
feeling that something has been left out. The judge is
likely to say to himself, "Now something has been said
on this question; I'm not absolutely sure what it is, but
where is it set forth in here?" and he will keep mentally
looking for the case. Then, when the controlling case is
set forth in your opponent's reply brief, your failure to
have dealt with it is, of course, emphasized. Do not run
that risk. Be entirely frank. If you are running into a case
that is against you, or if there is an aspect of the facts that
is against you, bring it out yourself. Do not leave it to the
other man to bring it out and to exploit your discom­
fiture.
Now as to the oral argument, I suppose the first ques­
tion in our Court is whether or not you should ask for
oral argument at all. That is a question in a good many
other appellate courts where oral argument is not re­
quired or indicated by the court itself in specific cases. I
think oral argument is extremely valuable. Someone has
described it in this way: "It's the one opportunity the
lawyer has to make sure that the essentials of his argu­
ment have passed at least once through the minds of
the judges who decide the case." I think oral argument is
actually entitled to a much stronger footing than that. In
my judgment you ought to argue any case that i's worth
asking the court to decide. We do not have that many
oral arguments now, but I suppose that in the next five
or ten years that may come to be so.
So far as the technique of oral argument is concerned,
and these are largely generalizations, you should keep in
mind your objective. You are talking to a group of men
by way of exposition and persuasion. They will know
your case in varying degrees. In our Court it may be that
about half of them will have read the briefs. You always
ought to try to find out, before you make your argument,
what the practice of the reviewing court is with respect
to reading the briefs in advance of argument. The an­
swer to this will make a difference in the way in which
you present your case. In our Court you cannot be sure.
In some cases all of the judges will have read the briefs;
in a' very rare case, where we are in a terrific jam, it may
be that no judge has read them. That would be a rare
situation with us today, although it once was the rule.
You ought to keep in mind that, to at least some of the
judges, your problem is likely not to be at all familiar.
You should state your facts, without heat, and then go
into your argument.
When you go into your argument, argue without read­
ing. Our rule prohibits reading from the briefs. No court
likes reading from the briefs. There is a story told about
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in which a
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man was standing there reading insistently and per­
sistently from his brief, and one judge-so the story
goes-wrote a note and passed it to his colleague. The
note said, "A brief-reader is the lowest form of animal."
The colleague looked at the note for a moment, took his
pen, wrote something on the paper, and passed it back,
and it read, "He is a vegetable." In our courts there is a
curious practice indulged in-prompted, I suppose, by the
rules prohibiting reading from the briefs. The curious
practice is that the lawyer writes out his oral argument
and then reads it to the court. The only appreciable dif­
ference between reading the argument or reading the
brief that I can see is that, if a man is reading from his
brief, the judge, by looking at his own copy, can gauge
the lawyer's progress and can form some rather accurate
notion as to when the lawyer is going to finish. Both
methods are effective in drawing a curtain between the
listener and the speaker. Do not read. It is all right to
have some notes to tie yourself to, but you should know
your case weli enough so that you do not need to read.
Do not try to make the oral argument carry more than
it can. In the average argument it does you no good, for
example, to cite a case by the full citation, including the
page reference and copious quotations. Of course, you
want to place the case cited in point of time, and you
can do that usually by naming a volume or the approxi­
mate year of the decision. Of course, there are unusual
situations where you will want to do more than that. But
all the oral argument can do is to leave an impression.
You cannot expect a court to keep in mind precise facts­
the very dramatic facts, yes; the details, no. Yet the im­
pact of oral argument is very strong. We hear oral argu­
ments in a term, and normally we have perhaps as many
as forty or fifty in a term. The surprising thing is that,
when the judge comes to work on the case, it slips into
focus. It is incredible how this happens. I have a poor
memory, and it should not work with me, but it does. I
have checked with my colleagues, and it works with
them. The judge will pick up the case; the title will be
unfamiliar; the name of the lawyer may not mean a
thing, and then all of a sudden there is some fact that is
familiar, and the whole oral argument comes back into
focus. I can pretty well see the man argue, and I can
pretty well remember what he said, even if I have been
so interested in the argument that I have failed to take
notes.
Brevity is most important. The tendency of many a
lawyer is to think that, because he has half an hour
within which to argue his case, he has to take the full
time. This does not follow at all. Some of the most effec­
tive arguments are made in fifteen or twelve minutes,
and, when the argument is over, there is nothing more
that needs to be said. When you are representing the
appellee, the temptation to take up time by restating the
facts will be terribly strong. I think that this is one of
the most fatal mistakes that you can make. When the
lawyer for the appellant has finished his argument, the
points he has made and the echoes of his argument are
still in the courtroom. Now the attorney for the appellee
rises to respond, and that is one of the most dramatic
moments I think in our whole judicial procedure. The
appellant has controlled the show up to that point; now
the court is looking to that man who rises to answer,
and what does he. do? Ever and ever so often he starts
over again and restates the facts. You listen for the first
minute or so quite attentively; you are waiting for that
difference-that significant difference-in his portrayal
of the facts to see what is going to affect the outcome of
the case. It does not come in the first minute; it does not
come in the second; and it does not come in the third.
You can just look out of the corner of your eye up and
down the bench, and you know he has lost the court.
Whether he ever makes up for this lost opportunity is
anybody's gamble, but he has not taken advantage of a
decisive moment. Do not be afraid to leave the case on
your opponent's statements, unless it is critically damag­
ing. Then, you will hold the court's interest when you
point out the different bearing of the facts or emphasize
the omitted facts. An interesting technique sometimes
used by the appellee is to begin by referring not to the
facts but to the general background in its legal frame­
work of the case at hand. When successfully done for a
brief period, this can take the court away from the details
and give a general background. The lawyer cannot do
this forever, of course, because we sit there waiting for
him to come back to the case. He has got to come down
to earth. But this gives him an opportunity to come back
with precision on the facts he wants to emphasize, and he
has dissipated the atmosphere that existed at the time he
began to speak and perhaps substituted some general
premises to which the court reacts favorably.
I think the best thing that has ever been said with
respect to questions asked by the court is "Rejoice when
the court asks you questions," and I think you should.
On a minimal basis, as it has been said, at least it is fairly
clear proof that the particular judge is not asleep. Start­
ing from that minimal basis, it seems to me that there is
nothing harder than arguing a case to a mute court, to a
court that sits there silent, and you do not know how
close to the mark your shots are going. You have no
notion as to whether you are meeting the problem that is
in the court's mind. You have no notion even whether or
not the court has a mind. Indeed, the court may be read­
ing the briefs of the next case. You know the court bench
is never as open to scrutiny from the other side as are the
law-school benches. The court bench slants upward, and
that gives the court an advantage which it has always
considered itself fully entitled to have.
I think most courts today will permit the use of ex­
pository devices by way of charts, maps, and that sort
of thing, which can be extremely helpful. This technique
can be helpful even on such matters as the construction
of a statute, where there may be a full column taken up
by the statute but where only about twenty-five words
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are important. Putting those twenty-five words on a
chart will keep them before the court. But, if you are
going to use charts, make them big enough. Among
the other deficiencies of judges, they tend to be near­
sighted. Most of us do not confess to a weakness like
that publicly, but, if you watch us lean forward squint­
ing in an effort to follow where counsel says we should
look in the brief, you will know it is true. Another point,
I believe, relates to the danger of referring to a photo­
stat in your brief rather than reproducing a big chart.
When the reference is to the photostat in the brief, I
have never seen it fail but that, when the lawyer thinks
he is through with the diagram or map and wants to
go ahead with his arguments, he will find that the court
will keep right on looking at the page of the abstract.
The court will keep looking at it for the balance of the
argument. On the other hand, if you have the chart your­
self, when you walk away from it, you can carry the
court's eyes with you.
There is one basic point I would impress upon you.
Keep in mind that the court is objective and that it is
approaching the case as a new matter. Keep in mind
also that, in deciding the case, the court, if it is worth
its salt, is going to be interested in fitting this case into
the existing body of decisions within the state. There­
fore, in your argument, put your case at the outset into
the existing structure of decisions of your particular
jurisdiction. Put it into that existing structure and show
the pressures of precedent which would push the deci­
sion one way and indicate also any counter pressures of
precedent which might lead to an opposite conclusion.
Do not argue your case, as is too often done, in terms
of rules. The law actually does not live in the statement
of the rule, including past statements of the rule by the
court, any more than it lives in the black letter of the
hornbook. The law lives and cases are decided-and
advocates become great advocates because they know this
-in that area of policy and in the considerations out of
which the black-letter rules evolve. Keep your written
argument and your oral argument pitched to take ac­
count of these considerations-not ostentatiously, I am
sure I do not have to tell you that-but do not put your
argument solely in terms of a bare absolute rule which
the court may have announced in a particular case. You
see, the judge may have written the opinion in that
particular case, and he will not be impressed a bit when
you tell him that the law of Illinois is inflexible because
of his opinion. The judge will want to know why the
rule has evolved and why it is important that the rule
either be extended or cut short of your particular case.
He will want to know the policy factors that govern
the particular case. Your statement of these factors in
the light of the structure of decided cases will be most
helpful to the court, and happily you will be most help­
ful to yourself and to your clients if you pitch your
argument this way, because this is the level on which
cases are actually won.
The Trial Court (Continued from page 1)
room. All cases are factual situations, and unless we the
lawyers have a comprehension of the facts and an under­
standing of what the- facts represent, we cannot truly
represent the cause. How do you get the facts? The most
fruitful way, in my opinion, at the cost of reiteration, is
through interviews with and signed statements from any
person who might be a witness whether that person is
favorable or adverse to your cause, or whether he or she
professes to know nothing about it. Obtain a statement
of what they know, or a statement to the effect that they
do not know anything of the matter in question. The
negative statement will save you the embarrassment of
being confronted in court with a person full of knowl­
edge concerning factual matters when you were led to
believe that in an out-of-court interview that person had
no knowledge whatsoever concerning that about which
he or she testifies. A signed statement is the circum­
scription of a witness' ability to testify in court. It is an
insurance policy that a given witness cannot violate the
contents of the statement without running the risk of
being plagued by it.
Of course, you students are familiar with discovery de­
vices. I am not going to spend any time discussing this.
Never, however, lose sight of the proposition that the
facts in any case are the most important part of that case.
Indeed, I am sure the Chief Justice will agree with me
on that statement.
After you have completed your factual survey, it is
usually well to confer with your client. Your investiga­
tion might have revealed things which apparently con­
tradict what he has previously told you. In an interview
with him, you can ask him about these apparently con­
tradictory matters. Frequently, he will have a valid ex­
planation, yet, if you were to go to court with that ex­
planation, you would be in no position to explain the
apparent contradiction for others. "Facts do not always
interpret themselves," and a trial is a classical interpreta­
tion of facts.
Your preparation should also concern your own
knowledge. In almost every lawsuit there is some sci­
entific or commercial matter involved. Thus, if it is an
accounting situation, or a medical case, or litigation in­
volving dynamite, do some work on it. Go to the text­
books and the appropriate journals. Then when in con­
ference with an expert, upon whose knowledge you wish
to draw, tell him your understanding of the problem and
ask him if it is correct. With that fundamental knowl­
edge which you have already obtained by your own
work, you will find that your concept of the problem
is readily made clearer. This is very important. Shall we
call it "self-preparation on the meaning of the facts in
a given case"?
Know, too, the law of the case. Know what you have
to prove in order to make out the case. If you represent
the defendant, know what the plaintiff has to prove in
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order to establish an issue of fact against your client.
Unless you know the law of the case, you will be uneasy
throughout the trial. You will find yourself at sea be­
cause of ignorance of those matters which must be not
only stressed but illustrated. Without knowledge of the
law of the case, you do not know what is necessary evi­
dence. Perhaps the proof is within the words of the wit­
nesses you have called. Yet, you may not inquire. The
result? Your case may fail for want of proof.
In the law school they probably tell you much about
the law. All I can say is always remember the law as
applied to the facts is the essence of each lawsuit.
That which at all times dominates the conduct of the
advocate is best summed up in this query: What will
its effect be upon the jury? This thought is paramount
in the advocate's mind when he decides whether he
shall accept a given case and follows him albeit sub­
consciously throughout the trial.
A lawsuit is a problem with a human instead of a
mathematical equation. That human equation is, of
course, the jury. Unless we give due regard to this fact,
we shall never reach a favorable solution.
Of course, no one can tell another how to try a law­
suit. And I do not care who he is; it just cannot be
done. And why is that? Because of the subjective ele­
ment. We are all different. You are you, and I am me.
And what might be effective for you may not be effec­
tive for me. And if I were to attempt to imitate you, if
I were to try a case as you, I would lose that sincerity
and that earnestness which is so important to one who
is attempting to convince twelve persons whom he has
met for the first time and with whom he is discussing
this judicial investigation. Be yourself. And another rea­
son why you cannot be an imposter is found in the fact
that there must be flexibility in the trial lawyer. The
trial lawyer must have a change of pace. He must be
able to be gentle at times and, on occasions, proceed
"straight from the shoulder," as it were. He must be
equal to the given situation if he is to be consistently
successful.
I have said no one can tell anyone else how to try
a case. However, there are a few cardinal principles
which govern the conduct of anyone in court. The first,
and the foremost of all those principles, is to make the
case simple. I do not care how complicated any case
may seem to be, you will find that it turns on one or
two kingpins. And make those kingpins of your case
stand out from the very outset. Do not throw in a lot
of "stuff"-and I use that word advisedly-which tends
to confuse the jury. Do not depend upon argument to
clear the smokescreen you have created. Let the im­
portant questions stand out from the very beginning of
the case. In fact, if you can do it in the interrogation
of the jury, do it. The earlier the jury knows the issues
in the case, the better.
With reference to simplicity, may I make this sug­
gestion? When the matter involves something requiring
scientific knowledge, medical knowledge, or knowledge
unusual in any degree, do not vaunt that knowledge.
Many times I have listed to cross-examinations wherein
the only two persons in the courtroom who knew what
was being discussed were the expert witness and the
cross-examiner. The jury knew nothing about it, and
many times I myself felt much as the jury. Always keep
your case at jury level.
Second, you must be a salesman, because you have
something to sell, namely, the merit of your side of the
case. And, of course, the greatest salesman in the case
is your client. In fact, we tell all our clients that they
have to be salesmen. Sometimes they look at you and
say "Huh?" Tell them that the Fuller brush man does
not have a monopoly on salesmanship. Tell them how
they have to have those characteristics which people
like. They have to be personable. They have to be polite.
They must at all times hold their tempers, no matter
what is brought out on cross-examination.
Third, the lawyer, especially he who has the burden
of proof, must keep the case moving forward. After all,
is he not the advocate who is asking the jury to af­
firmatively state that a given proposition has been
proved? By keeping the case moving forward, I mean
doing the thinking for the jury. If your client has the
burden of proof, he has to score points. Remember that
the court will tell the jury that if the evidence is evenly
balanced, the verdict will be for him who has no bur­
den. Remember that that will be the argument for op­
posing counsel. Thus, is it not evident that in order
to forestall a tie-which means a loss for that side of
the docket having the burden of proof-you must move
forward and score on the opposition?
Fourth, the conduct of the trial attorney should be
the epitome of sincerity and earnestness. Unless he has
an obvious sincere belief in the merits of his case, he
cannot convince others. Although "The Importance of
Being Earnest" may be the title of a book, it may also
be a rule to govern the trial lawyer at all times.
Fifth, never be personal with your adversary. No
matter how unprofessional his tactics may be, no matter
what the bar as a whole may think of him, no matter
whether he may be personally distasteful to you, never
indulge in personalities. He will have two or three
friends on the jury, regardless of what he is. And once
you begin to treat the matter as an issue between your
adversary and yourself, you will be "hitting home," and
they, who might otherwise decide the case for you on
the facts, will be against you. Indeed, you might well
prej udice yourself to the extent that they will be against
your cause because of your personal conduct. And when
such is the situation, you have not only failed in your
duty as an advocate, but you have done your client a
great disservice.
Always remember that your purpose in the case ,is to
present proper evidence and to exclude improper evi­
dence. If you have an objection, address yourself to the
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court. Make a specific objection, state your reasons, and
let the court rule on it. Stay out of these "asides" with
opposing counsel.
Sixth=-and this, I think, is very important-if you
and the court disagree on some question of law, do not
have that disagreement in the presence of the jury.
After all, the judge is the judge. And to the twelve lay
persons who are hearing the case, he is the most learned
man of the law in the room. If you have a question of
law upon which you and the judge happen to differ,
take it up without the presence of the jury. At times it
will be necessary to be firm with a court and to state
your position, fortified with authorities. If the court,
nevertheless, rules against, you, make your record in
the proper way. But do not get into any argument with
the judge in the presence of the jury, because it will be
certain to hurt your cause. Stay on the good side of the
judge-at least in the presence of the jury.
Many questions have been asked about juries by a
few of the students. The examination of the jury is
probably as important as any single phase in the case.
And why do I say this? Because that is the opportunity,
and the only opportunity, that the lawyer has to con­
verse with each of the twelve jurors. It is sometimes said
the judge should select the jury, and some judges do it
rather well, yet it only takes ten or fifteen minutes
longer if the lawyers do it properly. If the lawyer ex­
amines the juror, he has the opportunity to converse
with the person. Is there any better index to a person's
makeup than conversation? A person may be well
dressed, apparently intelligent, but conversation will re­
veal him otherwise. The conversation with the prospec­
tive juror will tell you much about his makeup, his
station in life, and how he would react to a given situa­
tion. Forecasting possible reactions is why we select
jurors.
Much has been said and more written on how to ex­
amine a juror. It may be summed up thus: Make a good
impression on the prospective jurors. How do you do
that? I do not know. But I think there are a few guide­
posts. In the examination be very polite with the pro­
spective juror. Never talk down to him. Thus, if he says
he is a maintainance man, don't say: Where do you do
the maintenance work? Never do anything to embarrass
a prospective juror in the presence of the strangers with
whom this juror has to live for at least two weeks. And, if
you believe or feel that you have done anything which has
embarrassed a prospective juror, do not hesitate to let
that juror go. Else you will be trying the case with the
fear that one of those jurors is against you.
And be candid with the prospective juror. Be open
with him. Bring out the unsavory in your case. If you
represent someone who has a criminal record, reveal that
in voir dire examination. Qualify the jurors on whether
they can give such a person a fair trial. And then when
you get their answers under oath, you can make much
of that in your argument. Anything which is unfavorable
about your case can, if revealed by you, have the "sting"
taken out of it.
Nor should you be too inquisitive. Get the necessary
information without prying into the lives of these per­
sons. After all, remember, as I have stated, they are
there among a host of strangers and when you ask a
lot of questions which go into their personal lives, and
which turn the clock back for them maybe twenty or
thirty years, you might well embarrass them.
There are occasions when it becomes necessary to
qualify the jurors about certain aspects of the case
as a whole. Take, for example, an action under the Fed­
eral Safety Appliance Act. That statute is foreign to
the jury. You cannot damage yourself by obtaining a
commitment from each of them that he or she will fol­
low the law as given to the jury by the court. Again,
suppose the case involves substantial damages. It might
be well to seek an agreement from each of the jurors
that if the defendant is guilty, he or she not only can
but will return a verdict for a substantial amount, pro­
vided a substantial verdict is justified by the law and
the evidence. Whenever there is anything unusual about
any feature of the case, the practice of qualifying the
jury as to that particular phase should be followed.
Today we have women and men jurors. And, some­
times, it is good to try to get women. Sometimes it is
good to try to get men. And why is that? Consider
women-as I know all of you do. My experience has
led me to believe that if a woman has anything some
other . woman desires, such as good looks, a handsome
husband, or money, beware of women. Women's in­
humanity to womankind is unequaled. Women are
more severe judges of their sex than the Judge of Judges.
They subject the conduct of another woman to a micro­
scopic scrutiny. Of course, if the woman has nothing
that another woman wants-making her what I believe
women call a good woman-and by that I mean some
poor bedeviled soul, then women are all right on the
jury. Women, on the other hand, are usually very good
where you represent a male-especially if he is hand­
some. He might be the biggest roue you have known.
He might be impeached on twelve occasions during the
trial. But they overlook all these things in a man. They
employ the "double standard" in the courtroom too. In
children's cases, women are, likewise, good. Now, men
are, as a whole, pretty level. And they are especially
good if you represent a woman, more so if that woman
might remind them of their mother.
There are certain people whom you should avoid.
Into that category I place, first of all, wealthy people.
They are always afraid that the status quo will be dis­
turbed. They are always afraid that a verdict will affect
their own pocketbook or increase their taxes. And, as I
say, they are inclined to leave the parties where they
found them.
Bank clerks, and those employed in clerical capacities
by large corporations for many years, are also to be
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avoided. They are, as a rule, persons of limited horizons.
You cannot try your case and at the same time change
their makeup. Likewise, I like to avoid engineers and
efficiency experts. These persons consider a lawsuit on a
mathematical basis. Now, a lawsuit is a problem. But,
as we have said, its equation is not mathematical; it is
human. They do not appreciate that. They are thinking
with a slide rule. They are not good, you will find.
Personally, I like to avoid young people, too. They
have not had enough of the experiences of life to ap­
preciate, in so far as a personal injury case is concerned,
the full meaning of the injury, or the death, whatever
it may be.
What, then, is the makeup of a good juror? Well, a
good juror to my way of thinking is a person forty-five
years of age or over, with some experience in the affairs
of life, falling without the categories which I have just
listed.
We all recognize that the only good jury is the jury
which returns the verdict for the cause you represent.
But, sometimes that is too late to find out; it's like an
autopsy-you are dead before you learn what is· wrong
with you.
What about the opening statement? When should you
make one? If you represent the plaintiff, you should by
all means make a statement. If you represent the de­
fendant, whether or not you make an opening statement
will depend upon the circumstances of the case. In
making an opening statement for the plaintiff, you
should tell the jury everything you expect to prove in
that statement. And do not be saying, "I hope the evi­
dence will show" or "I think the evidence will show."
Do not evince uncertainty. You need not overstate your
case, but the science of semantics says that there are
certain words which indicate uncertainty. Do not use any
of those words, or any of those phrases. Because if you
are uncertain, how can the jury be made certain? State
your case. Tell the good features. Tell the weak points.
State it in a chronological detailed manner so that the
jury can visualize the situation. And when they hear
the testimony of the witnesses and see the exhibits which
are admitted into evidence, these will have some mean­
ing for them. The purpose of the opening statement is
to give the jury a preview of the case.
In the presentation of evidence try to follow the
opening statement. Present the case in a chronological
way. And I am glad to hear Justice Schaefer say that
his court favors graphs and visual aids. Put those in evi­
dence first. Then your first witness is the man or woman
who is your best-the witness who clinches liability with
serpentine force. It is the old story of first impressions
being lasting ones. Sandwich in your weaker witnesses.
Probably the last witness should be your second-best
witness. But calling a lot of witnesses may lead you into
trouble. I prefer to have the statements and give the
other side the witnesses. Just put on the witnesses re­
quired to prove your case or your defense. If you have
statements from the other witnesses, then you have them
tied down. If they should testify without the confines
of that statement, they are impeached, and the other
side's cause is damaged. Above all, if you are ever un­
certain about whether a witness will make a good wit­
ness, do not put him on the stand.
Cross-examination can be dangerous. Usually it re­
sults in having the witness repeat his testimony a second
time. If a witness has not damaged your case, do not
cross-examine him. By so doing, you can give importance
to testimony actually unimportant. Do not cross-examine
without a motive. The cross-examination must be con­
ducted so that motive is never known to the witness.
Accordingly, it is well to go from one subject to an­
other so that your motive is thus concealed. Do not at­
tempt to make a damaging admission too perfect. If
you do so, your effort will probably result in the wit­
ness recovering himself.
While the witness is testifying on direct, watch him.
Many lawyers are busy writing down what he says
without looking at him while he is testifying. Personally,
I like to watch the witness on his direct examination.
You can usually tell whether he is the type of witness
who will adhere to every detail of the direct examination
when being cross-examined, regardless of the actual facts.
Moreover, you will be in a position to know those facts
about which he is uncertain. Does he hesitate? Perhaps
he shows some reluctance about a matter which you can
effectively cross-examine upon. You will frequently find
that observation of the witness will reveal his "Achilles
heel."
Cross-examination methods? Here honey draws more
flies than vinegar. This business of shouting at the wit­
ness, pointing a finger in his face, does not accomplish
anything. You will find that you will get more damag­
ing admissions from any witness if you treat that wit­
ness politely and with deference. Treat him kindly. As
you go along, you will find that you will get admissions
from him. If you have something with which to de­
stroy the witness, such as an impeaching statement, I
think it should be used at the outset of your examina­
tion. First of all, get him down deep in mire. Get him
down on record two or three times to what he testified
to on direct, and then use the impeaching statement.
After you use that impeaching statement, you find that
you are usually the master on the rest of the examina­
tion. He will agree to almost anything you say, because
he does not know what else you have. You deflate him;
you demoralize him; you make him fearful. Tha=t====is���====
why I say to use the destructive force at the beginning.
Of course, you do not use a statement unless it is really
impeaching. If you have a statement from him and it
just has one or two contradictions in it, do not use it,
because a jury will know that he told outside of court
substantially what he told in court.
Argument is not argument in the true sense of the
term. You are not arguing with your adversary; you
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are merely seeking to persuade twelve persons who must
listen to you. The jury is a captive audience. You are
the one who chooses the topic. You are the one who
chooses the mode of presentation. You will be surprised
at what a calm, orderly discussion of even the undis­
puted facts will do for your side. Use all the rhetorical
devices; similes, metaphors, illustrations, everything to
help the jury think, because argument is nothing but
an audible, thinking process. Once you get the jury
thinking with you, then, of course, you have gained the
upper hand and are their master.
May I observe that expert testimony, notwithstanding
the many volumes written about it, is frequently over­
looked. Many times we encounter situations with facts
which have meaning only when explained by an expert.
This is an effective avenue of illustrating the meaning
of facts when such are not within the purview of the
ordinary man. Always investigate the feature of expert
testimony in your case.
May I direct your attention to the hypothetical ques­
tion-properly employed this is an effective device. In­
deed, it constitutes an argument while evidence is being
introduced. It wraps up the entire case, so to speak, and
presents for the expert an opinion which makes for
better understanding by the jury.
Another word. Rebuttal evidence is, it seems to me,
overlooked. Too often a witness for the defense testifies
concerning a fact which has not been brought out on
the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff disputes that fact and
has within his power evidence to controvert it. How­
ever, he accepts that the jury understands that he denies
these facts and closes his proof when the defendant does.
The realization of this error is not appreciated until he
hears defendant's counsel argue that thus and so was
not denied by the plaintiff. The same holds for the de­
fendant as well as the plaintiff. As far as the defendant
is concerned, it becomes a matter of surebuttal.
Thank you. It has been a real pleasure to be here.
Krock on Crosshcy (Continuedfrompage8)
WASHINGTON, Feb. IS-In this space last Tuesday an
account, necessarily inadequate, was given of a revolu­
tionary concept of the meaning of the language of the
Constitution that was evolved by Prof. William Winslow
Crosskey, after fifteen years of intense research into writ­
ings contemporaneous with its drafting. It was reported
that, on the evidence he offered of what words meant in
the eighteenth century, these were among his startling
conclusions:
�"Commerce" meant all gainful activity by the people;
hence the long-made judicial distinction between "inter­
state" and "intrastate" commerce has no warrant in the
Constitution.
�By "States" its drafters meant the people within spe­
cified territories, and not these territories or their internal
regulations. Hence it was intended that the power given
Congress to "regulate (govern) commerce" covered all
gainful activity within state borders.
�Congress was designed to be supreme among the
branches of the Federal Government; the Supreme Court
was never intended to po§sess a general power to review
the Acts of Congress, only those dealing with its spe­
cific province; and the Supreme Court was not bound
to follow state courts' interpretation of state law and
local common law. In the first instance it has violated the
Constitution; in the second it has "abdicated" its ap­
pointed role.
Though Professor Crosskey's work is a miracle of
scholarly research, and is being read with serious atten­
tion by, among others, members of the Supreme Court,
its thesis is so controversial that one lawyer wrote to this
department: "Now I join the book burners!" Did not,
he demanded, Chief Justice John Marshall know the
semantics of the eighteenth century, in which he was
born and in which he helped to draft the Constituttion?
And, if a "state" did not mean a specific territory and
local government, why did the Founding Fathers em­
power Congress to regulate commerce "among" the sev­
eral states?
o.THER CONCLUSIONS
The author, who was law secretary to. Chief Justice
Taft, has answers for these and other dissents, as follows:
�Eighteenth century documents show no evidence that
"among" was used in the sense of "between." An ex­
ample is a press report that "a severe hurricane blew
among the Windward Islands," and "it is needless to
point out that the hurricane blew 'within' as well as
'between' them."
�Marshall's career "was a long and stubborn rear-guard
action in defense of the Constitution" as it was meant
to be read. "Nevertheless, he was continually forced ...
into compromise and defeat, the cumulative effect of
which amounted to a transformation of the Constitu­
tion."
Book Reviews (Continued from page 5)
a Democratic plank. In Mr. Pettengill's opinion the pres­
ent marginal rate of 92 per cent represents a triumph
of the poor in their war against the rich foreseen by
Justice Field in his opinion in the Pollock case. A heavy
progressive or gr'aduated income tax represents the
achievement of one plank in the Communist Manifesto
of 1848 and moves the country definitely along the
"road to serfdom." We should return to proportionate
taxation or we all will soon join the perished civiliza­
tions of the past by consuming ourselves "through ex­
cessive and unjust taxation" until we collapse "and are
succeeded by the Man on Horseback or the rank growth
of the jungle."
18 The Law School Record Vol. 3, No.2
Articles which rise to such heights of rhetorical pitch
certainly serve to demonstrate the need of an objective
and logical treatment of the question of progression at
a time when the needs of previous wars, the obligations
of world leadership, and the demands of defense have
thrust upon this country tax burdens the like of which
no country has ever borne before. A reasonable degree
of progression may well be a political necessity at such
a time; Certainly alternatives are limited. In any event,
the arguments for and against progression need new
analysis at such a time. At the most, a better knowledge
will help us to move intelligently forward in the job
of improving the present tax system; at the least, it may
comfort some of those who complain by showing that
the arguments on the question go in two directions.
Professors Blum and Kalven have picked tip the story
of progressive taxation pretty much at the point where
Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman left that story in his
book Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice. They
call an article published in 1916 in the Yale Law Journal
"virtually the last gasp of constitutional objection to the
principle of progression" and dispose quickly of the con­
stitutional aspects of progression. They then examine
the policy objections to progression: (1) that it com­
plicates the structure of the income tax and expands
taxpayer opportunity for ingenuity directed to lawful
avoidance; (2] that it is a politically irresponsible for­
mula; and (3) that it lessens the economic productivity
of society. They conclude that these arguments are not
enough to stand in the way of a strong affirmative case
for progression. The book then discusses the affirmative
case, including the arguments (1) that progression
makes for wider fluctuation of annual revenues and
thus provides a built-in flexibility; (2) that benefits pur­
chased with taxation justify a graduated scale of rates;
(3) that progression establishes an equitable apportion­
ment of the sacrifice involved in the payment of taxes;
(4) that the Seligman "faculty" theory, a variation of
the popular principle of ability to pay, permits gradua­
tion of rates; and (5) that progression operates to lessen
inequalities in the distribution of income and even to re­
distribute income in a desirable way and to promote great­
er equality of opportunity. After this "long critical look"
the case for progression turns out to be "stubborn but
uneasy." To the authors notions of benefit, sacrifice,
ability to pay, and economic stability have less appeal
than arguments which view progressive taxation as a
means of reducing economic inequalities. But the case
for more economic equality is itself "perplexing," par­
ticularly when it is voiced by "those who in the quest
for greater equality are unwilling to argue for radical
changes in the fundamental institutions of the society."
Many persons would disagree, and many would agree,
with this final and somewhat ambivalent judgment of
Professors Kalven and Blum. No two persons would
agree with their conclusions as to the weight to be
given the respective arguments for and against progres-
sion. But few would dispute the timeliness of this survey
of progressive taxation. It is a carefully documented,
closely reasoned, highly readable discussion of one of
the most difficult problems of our troubled times. It
fills a vacuum in tax literature. It is not a "luxury" item.
It needed to be written, and it needs to be widely read.
Both those who favor and those who oppose progres­
sion will discuss that subject more intelligently after
they have read this study.
In fact, it would be hard to think of any group in our
population who would not profit from a reading of
this scholarly book. Senators and representatives would
acquire a useful perspective. If they will read the book
carefully, students of taxation still in universities, and
those in post-graduate life who have not yet resigned
themselves to lack of understanding of taxation, will
gain new insight into the meaning of a fierce struggle
of our times. I will go so far as to urge that tax spe­
cialists will acquire increased competence in dealing
with the problems they face as they represent taxpay­
ers in practice if they are able, as they will be better able
after reading the book, to integrate their problems in the
panoramic development of their special subject. Too
few tax specialists realize this necessity.
The book is to some extent historical and to a larger
extent theoretical. That does not mean that its history
is ancient, or that its theory is unrelated to modern tax
life. There is nothing more relevant to tax debate at the
middle of the 20th century than the questions whether
progression dampens incentives and whether it aids in
maintaining economic stability and a high level of busi­
ness activity. Whatever one may conclude, it is important
to canvass the extent to which progression complicates
the positive law of taxation. And it is certainly worth
while to analyze the merits of progression in the light
of how our Government spends the money it collects.
Last but not least, the book explores many areas and
analyzes a number of principles that may be too much
taken for granted in these days of high taxation.
Among those who assume the propriety of progres­
sive taxation are many tax philosophers who like to call
themselves liberals. Some of them may feel that in ex­
amining their articles of faith the book gives aid and
comfort to their ideological enemies. In this respect the
book could suggest to some of its readers that many
liberals and conservatives are not different under the skin
because they both object to the presentation of argu­
ments against propositions in which they deeply be­
lieve. It is not the point that the book- has confirmed
rather than shaken my belief that there should be more,
rather than less, progression in the American tax sys­
tem. The effect on other readers may be different. The
point is that both sides of any argument should have a
fair hearing. Time has eroded many faiths to which men
have given their last measure of devotion. It is as true
today as it was in 1920 that the best test of truth is its
ability to gain acceptance in an intellectual market place
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that denies no one his opportunity to speak freely
against, as well as for, the majority opinion of the
moment. Some liberals would be better liberals if they
were less like some conservatives, and their condemna­
tion of their opponents would be at least more graceful
and becoming if they practiced what they preached and
opened their minds as freely to arguments with which
they disagree as to those with which they agree.
RANDOLPH PAUL
Paul, Weiss, Rijhind, Wharton and Garrison; formerly
General Counsel for the Treasury Department
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS. By Friedrich Kessler
and Malcolm P. Sharp. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1953. Pp. xiv, 793. $8.50.
[Reprinted, with permission, from Journal of Legal
Education, Vol. 6, No.3, pp. 405-7.]
For years it has been well known that something was
cooking at the University of Chicago Law School in
connection with Contracts, and from time to time we
have caught glimpses of the cooks at work. The product
is now brought forth for public consumption and is a
very welcome addition to the menu.
Kessler and Sharp show again, as Havighurst, Fuller,
and Mueller had shown in different ways, that the first
year course in Contracts can be made to yield fresh in­
sight and some original views of law and society. The
novelty of their treatment does not lie, however, as it
does in the case of Havighurst and Mueller, in concentra­
tion on function or economic "context." Instead, the em­
phasis throughout is on some very broad conceptions.
One of the authors recently stated his own conviction
that "the all-important question of the domain of free­
dom of contract should from the outset be made one of
the central themes, if not the central theme, in any text
on contracts." It seems that the same conviction applies
to casebook as well as text in the minds of both authors.
Their preoccupation with this theme starts with their
own introductory text which traces historically the pro­
gression: from-status-to-contract-and-rever�e. Then, there
is a scattering of cases that project over a very wide
panorama the theme of freedom versus control. The sec­
tion headings and comments through the somewhat
more standard materials that follow are also calculated
to keep this theme in the foreground for discussion.
Then, at the end, there is a chapter of about a hundred
pages that digs into illustrative problems of "irregularity,
inequality, and imperfect competition"-agreements in
restraint of trade, the "contract of adhesion" (illustrated
by automobile merchandising arrangements), problems
of labor and collective bargaining, and "status and con­
tract in insurance."
The standard contracts materials that comprise most
of the book are arranged under headings and with com­
ments that emphasize values and objectives, often in a
most arresting way. In place of the usual procession, mov-
ing from offer to acceptance to consideration to the seal,
etc., the authors have mixed these elements together in
unusual combinations. Consideration, for example, ap­
pears ahead of the offer-acceptance and assent problems
in a context which reveals it as a limitation on freedom
of contract. The subtitle of the chapter that provides this
first glimpse is "the basic ideals of an individualistic law
of contracts," and the doctrine of consideration is here
placed beside mistake doctrines (limiting freedom to
determine price), risk assumption as to unforeseen dif­
ficulties, and requirements as to foreseeability of damages
(Hadley v. Baxendale). Then, after a brief skirmish with
tests of mutual assent, the significance of the "implied
contract," and preliminary negotiations as distinguished
from offers, the authors return to consideration in con­
nection with "firm offers, a preliminary study of the
ideal of reciprocity"; then again with offer and accept­
ance in contracts by correspondence and offers of uni­
lateral contracts; and finally work around to a direct
attack on the consideration doctrine itself. But other
aspects of consideration then reappear in the following
chapter concerned with "fairness of the bargain and
equality"-i.e., with problems of economic duress in
connection with readjustments of obligations and per­
formance of pre-existing duty. In short, the attentive
reader is forced to see the protean character of the re­
markable term "consideration"; forced also to relate the
common law techniques for contract formation to the
values they are supposed to serve.
The authors have also included substantial quantities
of material that is either usually reserved for a second
or third year course in Restitution or else omitted from
law school instruction entirely-material on mistake, du­
ress, and restitution to or against a promisor in default.
This material is not confined to a separate section in the
latter part of the book so that it can be conveniently
omitted. It is dispersed throughout and is essential to
much of the analysis. As everyone knows who has
worked over this material, it adds greatly to the interest,
complexity, and depth of contracts problems. There is
very much to be said for including it in the first year
Contracts course, full-scale. The only arguments against
full-scale inclusion that impress the present reviewer
(and they do) rest on the difficulty of the issues they
raise and the unsatisfactoriness of partial treatment in a
Contracts course that is already overcrowded. Altogether,
Kessler and Sharp have achieved a major shift of em­
phasis and provided, at the least, a much needed correc­
tive. The standard materials for Contracts courses have
surely given a distorted picture of the functions and limi­
tations of contract in our society. Great teachers have
no doubt transcended the materials. One need only men­
tion Corbin, Oliphant, and Llewellyn to suggest the
brains and imagination that have worked over this same
subject matter. But on the whole, country-wide, the at­
traction of the usual Contracts course has been the op­
portunity for intensive drill in technique and analytical
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skills while pursuing some simple, scarcely debatable
objectives. It is difficult to oppose, if one wished to, the
objectives of effectuating intent and maximizing indi­
vidual autonomy. The limitations on these objectives are
usually thought to be confined to the doctrines of ille­
gality, which in the casebooks are left to the last section
so that they are never reached at. all or are reserved for
the last day's "lecture." The result is training in close
and refined analysis with very little attention to those
larger issues of policy that require a different but equally
necessary lawyer's technique-the weighing of conflicting
interests, the choice between basic values, maturity of
judgment.
The question that obviously cannot be answered with­
out using this book is whether the authors have gone
too far in reversing directions. By comparison with the
widely used Contracts casebooks, excepting only Fuller's,
this casebook is short. It has 793 pages of which 100 pages
at the end are devoted to the "control" sector-agree­
ments in restraint of trade, labor and collective bargain­
ing, etc. It also includes, of course, the material on resti­
tution for mistake, duress, and related grounds, though
the volume of this is not great-perhaps 25 cases. One
should also add that somewhat smaller type and a fuller
page give about 20 per cent more reading matter per page
than most of the standard books. Still, it is not a long
casebook, and the inclusions mean many exclusions. For
example, the treatment of equitable remedies seems ex­
ceedingly skimpy-five cases in a section of eleven pages
plus the scattering of six or seven specific performance
cases that almost all the Contracts casebooks use and
that are inserted for reasons other than the light they
throw on equitable remedies. It is disappointing too that
two authors, both of whom are so competent in dealing
with foreign law, should not have slipped in at least a
few ideas by way of comparison with European results.
But it is useless to ask for too much. These particular
shortfalls, if shortfalls they are, do not raise so great a
question as the thinness of treatment of many standard
problems of analysis, especially the more technical prob­
lems. Many times in reading over the cases and notes,
one feels that the authors are content to be suggestive
and wish at all cost's to avoid being exhaustive. This
becomes a question of teaching theory, and it may be that
Chicago students are brighter, but one often wishes that
implications were explored, suggestions made more ex­
plicit, and more material provided for working out the
hard questions. Even if one concedes that offer-accept­
ance, consideration, and conditions have, in the past, been
fantastically overdone, the question survives in my own
SUMMER JOBS. Many of our students are interested
in supplementing their academic work with summer
clerkships in law offices. If you have a job to offer, or
know where one is available, please notify the Place­
ment Office of the Law School.
mind whether Kessler and Sharp, under compulsions of
space, have not left them quite a bit underdone. One
could only tell by trying.
The care and scholarship shown throughout are of the
highest order-all that one would expect of the authors.
The notes and authors' text are full of clues and sugges­
tions helpful to the teacher (question: how many of the
footnote citations do the authors really expect students
to read?). The arrangement is ingenious and thought­
provoking all the way. The selection of cases is excellent.
This is, in short, a first-class book which will open new
directions for all teachers of the subject and have per­
manent effects for the good of all concerned.
JOHN P. DAWSON
University ofMichigan Law School
Sheldon Tcff: (Continued from page 2)
at Oklahoma in 1948. I understand that he has resisted
other recent invitations. He has recently edited a new case­
book on property with Mr. Aigler of Michigan.
This amateur profilist has not had easy work with
Sheldon Tefft. His eccentricities, if any, are minor, and
in supposedly more serious and important matters the
record is singularly blank, for Tefft doesn't "do" things,
doesn't agitate, doesn't champion, doesn't sign petitions,
and doesn't join. He talks, or rather he debates, so that
you can't get much out of him-very few concessions or
admissions. My most authentic informant said, years
ago, "Well, you know, Sheldon is cagey."
There are only a few light touches to close 'on. I have
learned in my researches that my subject is at heart a
mechanic (he repairs bicycles), that he has a strong feel­
ing for antique objects and jewels, and that he is extrava­
gant. These are "profile" data of fair quality. I believe
some of them. But I shall have to deflate the sensational­
ism of that last item. No one can ever persuade me that
Sheldon Tefft is extravagant. It is a fact, verifiable by his
every acquaintance, that he is always searching for bar­
gains. I have never heard, from him, of his finding any.
The Tefft ideal price level is so low (an undetermined
figure always less than any price actually paid) that I am
sure he feels reckless whenever he makes a purchase.
That must be the reason for the attribution of extrava­
gance; I can think of no other.
ROBERT DILLER '37, J.S.D. '40
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